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On June 6, 1995, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit overturned a Federal Agency Order that the International Longshore-
men's Association's (ILA's) call for solidarity with Japanese unionists was
a secondary boycott in violation of the National Labor Relations Act.' The
D.C. Circuit Court held that the ILA's request of the Japanese union workers
to refrain from unloading ships bearing citrus loaded by nonunion labor was
not a secondary boycott in violation of the National Labor Relations Act
because the act does not extend to the activities of foreign workers, who are
not engaged in commerce within the meaning of the National Labor
Relations Act.2 In 1992, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
arrived at a very different conclusion in reviewing the same set of facts. In
Dowd v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, the Eleventh Circuit held that
the ILA's conduct in encouraging Japanese importers to boycott certain
American stevedoring3 companies did fall within the jurisdiction of the
National Labor Relations Act.4 The question of the extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion of the secondary boycotts provision of the NLRA to matters involving
foreign workers in foreign lands begs the larger question of whether the
labor and employment laws of the United States are limited in the scope of
their power to American workers employed within the territorial boundaries
of the United States. Does the NLRA ever warrant extraterritorial jurisdic-
* J.D., The University of Georgia, 1997; B.A., American University, 1993. Special
thanks to my wife for her love and unceasing encouragement.
1 It is important to note that not all secondary boycotts are a violation of the NLRA. In
NLRB v. Fruit Packers, the Supreme Court concluded that Congress did not intend to bar "all
peaceful consumer picketing at secondary sites." 377 U.S. 58, 63 (1964).
2 International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 56 F.3d 205 (D.C.
Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1040 (1996).
3 A stevedore is "one who works at or is responsible for loading and unloading ships in
port. WEBsTE's NINTH NEw COLLEGiATE DICTIONARY 1156 (1988).
4 975 F.2d 779 (11th Cir. 1992).
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tion5 in order to effectuate Congressional intent?
As the world economy develops a greater and greater interdependence, and
as U.S. industry and commerce become increasingly affected by the activities
of individuals and entities not within the territorial limits of the United
States, a need for clarity and predictability in the extraterritorial application
of U.S. labor law has emerged. Part I of this Note will review the facts of
the dispute, the relevant sections of the NLRA and past decisions interpreting
the extraterritorial application of U.S. employment law, specifically the
NLRA. Part II of this Note will analyze the two recent decisions regarding
the secondary boycotts engaged in by Japanese stevedores and encouraged
by U.S. unions. Part I of this Note will propose a judicial approach that
will be consistent with the past interpretations of the jurisdiction of the
NLRA, and in recognition of the growing globalization of U.S. commerce
and in keeping with legislative intent of the NLRA, set forth the proposition
that secondary boycotts of U.S. products conducted abroad solicited by U.S.
unions acting in the United States are a violation of the secondary boycotts
provision of the National Labor Relations Act.
I. ANALYZING AND COMPARING THE DECISIONS OF DOWD V.
INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN'S Ass'N AND INTERNATIONAL
LONGSHOREMEN'S ASS'N V. NAT'L LABOR RELATIONS BD.
A. Historical Facts of the Dispute
The quarrel in both of these cases arises from a labor dispute in the
Florida citrus export industry.6 Japan is a major importer of Florida citrus
fruit, and prior to the events at issue in this dispute, Florida exporters
shipped fruit to Japan from either Fort Pierce, Florida, or Port Canaveral,
Florida." This export arrangement was pursuant to agreements between
American exporters and Japanese importers. In the handling of the citrus
cargo, American stevedores of the Coastal Stevedoring Company ("Coastal")
of Fort Pierce and the Port Canaveral Stevedoring Company ("Canaveral")
of Port Canaveral loaded the fruit on ships bound for Japan. Upon the
- "Extraterritorial jurisdiction" is defined as "[]uridical power which extends beyond the
physical limits of a particular state or country." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 588 (6th ed.
1990).
6 International Longshoremen's, 56 F.3d at 208.
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fruit's arrival in Japan, it was unloaded by Japanese stevedores.8 The
International Longshoremen's Association (ILA), an American Union, had
been in disputes with the stevedoring companies of these two ports regarding
the failure of these companies to hire union-represented employees.9
Prior to the 1990-1991 shipping season, ILA representatives traveled to
Japan and met with representatives of the National Council of Dockworkers'
Unions of Japan, the Japan Labor Union Association, and the Japanese
Seamen's Union. ° The ILA delegates requested the assistance of the
Japanese unions in applying whatever pressure they could upon participants
in the Japanese citrus trade to deal only with Florida stevedoring companies
which used union labor. The Japanese unions then proceeded to pressure
Japanese importers, urging the importers to deal only with union stevedoring
companies when purchasing citrus fruit in Florida. These communications
from the Japanese unions went so far as to warn the Japanese importers that
the Japanese stevedoring unions would refuse to unload fruit loaded in
American ports by non-union labor."1 As a result of the activities of the
Japanese unions, at least one ship was diverted from Fort Pierce to Tampa,
where union stevedores were employed. After the diversion to Tampa of a
citrus-bearing sea vessel, the ILA contacted a National Council of Dock-
workers' Union of Japan to express the appreciation of the ILA and to
encourage the continued efforts of the Japanese unions.1 This was the
second such written communication to the Japanese unions from the ILA.13
As a result of the aforementioned activities of the Japanese unions taken on
behalf of the ILA, neither Port Canaveral nor Fort Pierce handled another
shipment of citrus bound for Japan for the remainder of the 1990-1991
export season. 4
It was at this point that the litigation on the issue began. In November
and December of 1990, the two non-union stevedoring companies of Port
Canaveral and Fort Pierce, respectively Canaveral and Coastal, and the
Canaveral Port Authority, all filed unfair labor practices against the
International Longshoremen's Association. 5 Subsequently, the National
8 id.9 1&
'o Dowd, 975 F.2d at 781.
n Id at 781-782.
2 Id. at 782.
13 Id.
14 id.
15 International Longshoremen's, 56 F.3d at 208.
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Labor Relations Board (NLRB) sought an injunction to prohibit the ILA
from threatening persons neutral to its labor dispute with Coastal and
Canaveral. The NLRB also sought an order requiring the ILA to repudiate
its written requests for aid from the Japanese stevedoring unions.1 6 The
United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida granted the
NLRB's requests17 and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. With the injunc-
tion in place, the parties waived a hearing 9 and submitted the case before
the National Labor Relations Board. On November 24, 1993, the Board held
that the ILA violated the NLRA's provision against unlawful secondary
boycotts.' ° The ILA then petitioned the United States Circuit Court for the
District of Columbia for review. On June 6, 1995, the Court granted the
petition for review, respectfully disagreed with the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals, and remanded the case to the National Labor Relations Board for
further proceedings consistent with its opinion.2
B. The Basis of the Dispute
The dispute between the International Longshoremen's association and the
National Labor Relations Board revolves around whether or not the ILA, by
encouraging Japanese unions to refuse to handle citrus loaded in Florida by
non-union labor, committed a secondary boycott in violation of the National
Labor Relations Act. In order to understand the nature of the conflict, an
understanding of what constitutes a secondary boycott is necessary.
A boycott may be defined as a concerted refusal to have dealings with (as
in a person, store, or organization) in order to express disapproval or apply
economic pressure as a means of achieving a desired end.' In a primary
boycott, one party to a dispute, the boycott advocate, exerts economic
pressure directly against his opposing party in an effort to compel the latter
party to give in to the former's demands. In order to apply further pressure
to the 'primary' opponent, the boycott proponent applies economic or social
16 Id. at 208-09.
17 Dowd v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 781 F. Supp. 1565 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
's Dowd, 975 F.2d 779 (1 1th Cir. 1992).
19 In waiving a hearing and submitting the case to the Board based on stipulated facts, the
parties waived an administrative law judge's decision.
20 International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 313 N.L.R.B. 412 (1993).
21 International Longshoremen's, 56 F.3d at 205.
' WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 173 (1988).
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pressure against third parties who deal with the 'primary' opponent23 so that
they will join the boycott advocate's cause. The result is a secondary
boycott.2 In the case of a labor dispute, one common means of creating a
secondary boycott arises when a labor organization in a dispute with an
employer, Company "A," urges the employees of a neutral secondary party,
Company "B," to engage in a partial work stoppage or a refusal to handle
certain goods produced or shipped by Company "A."'  The dispute between
the ILA and the non-union stevedoring companies involves this particular
kind of secondary boycott. The idea behind such pressure exerted against
secondary parties is that the secondary parties (Company "B") who are
injured through their own employees' refusal to work will apply pressure to
the primary target of the boycott (Company "A") to accede to the demands
of the primary boycott advocate (the labor union).
At common law, the use of such secondary boycotts was treated by the
states as strictly illegal since the courts treated the pressure brought to bear
on the secondary party as coercive.' In 1932, the legal status of secondary
boycotts changed with the passage of The Norris-LaGuardia Act,' which
protected most peaceful labor activity, including secondary boycotts.
28
Strong unions were quick to realize the potency of the secondary boycott
weapon and became abusive of this newly found power to exert secondary
boycotts. Partly in response to the abusive activity of such unions, Congress
passed the Taft-Hartley Act, also known as the Labor Management Relations
Act (LMRA), in 1947.29
' These parties in this situation are often termed secondary parties.
Justice Learned Hand provided one of the best definitions of secondary boycott in
International hd. of Elec. Workers Local 501 v. NLRB (where electricians' union picketed
to encourage employees of carpentry subcontractor to engage in work stoppage, with intent
of coercing the subcontractor to pressure general contractor to hire union labor): "The
gravamen of a secondary boycott is that its sanctions bear, not upon the employer who alone
is a party to the dispute, but upon some third party who has no concern in it. Its aim is to
compel him to stop business with the employer in the hope that this will induce the employer
to give in to his employees' demands." 181 F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir. 1950), affid, 341 U.S. 694
(1951).
25 See, e.g., International Bhd, 181 F.2d 34.
26 A. Cox ET AL., LABOR LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 654-655 (11th ed. 1991).
' Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932, ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§ 101-115 (1994)).
21 Id. at § 4, 47 Stat. 70 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1994)).
29 Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. § 141-187 (1994)).
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The Taft-Hartley Act empowered the National Labor Relations Board to
forbid the unfair labor practices of unions as well as employers. This Act
amended the NLRA and made it an unfair labor practice for a labor
organization or union to engage in, or to encourage the employees of any
employer to engage in, a strike or concerted work stoppage where the object
of that strike or work stoppage was to force or require any employer to cease
doing business with any other person.31 The legislative history of the Taft-
Hartley Act makes clear that this provision was intended to outlaw secondary
boycotts aimed at the business of third parties "wholly unconcerned" with
the disagreement between the labor organization and the primary employ-
er.32 In 1959, Congress passed the Landrum-Griffin Act33 to close gaps
and loopholes overlooked in prior secondary boycott legislation.34 Con-
gress, in drafting the new secondary boycott provision,35 had two principal
goals: 36  to decrease the burdens on neutral employers drawn into labor
30 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1994).
31 Id. at § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B).
3293 CONG. REC. 4198 (statement of Sen. Taft), reprinted in 2 NLRB, Legislative History
of the LMRA, 1947, at 1106 (1948). Ironically, it is evident that "secondary" companies that
were able to apply pressure to a "primary" employer were anything but "unconcerned" with
the labor dispute.33 Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (Landrum-Griffin Act), Pub.
L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (codified as amended 29 U.S.C. § 153, 158-160, 164, 186, 187,
401-531 (1994)).
' See National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 633 (1967).
35 "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-
... (4)(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual
employed by any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting
commerce to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his
employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle
or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform
any services; or (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in
commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where in either case an
object thereof is-
... (B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling,
handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other
producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any
other person..."
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1994).
36 In 1951, the Supreme Court stated the objectives of the secondary boycotts provision
as being the "dual congressional objectives of preserving the right of labor organizations to
bring pressure to bear on offending employers in primary labor disputes and of shielding
unoffending employers and others from pressure in controversies not their own." NLRB v.
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disputes and to prevent the widening of industrial strife.3
However, the primary issue in this dispute between the NLRB and the
International Longshoremen's Association is not whether a secondary boycott
occurred. Rather, the question is: if a secondary boycott occurred, is this
secondary boycott involving Japanese unions and foreign lands within the
jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Act? The Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals in Dowd stated that the actions of the International Longshore-
men's Association do fall within the purview of the NLRB.3" The District
of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals came to a different conclusion and
"respectfully disagree[d]".39 To understand the different conclusions arrived
at by the two courts, it becomes necessary to analyze and review the manner
in which United States courts have interpreted the will and intent of
Congress in approaching the issue of the extraterritorial application of U.S.
statutes, and specifically, labor and employment statutes.
C. Judicial History of the Larger Dispute-the Extraterritorial Application
of (1) U.S. Law and of (2) The National Labor Relations Act
1. U.S. Law
The history of the extraterritorial application of U.S employment laws
begins with an analysis of the various presumptions involved in the
extraterritorial application of U.S. laws. In American Banana Co. v. United
Fruit,'" the United States Supreme Court first considered the extraterritorial
application of a federal statute. The Court in American Banana was asked
to decide whether or not to apply the Sherman Anti-Trust Act to a dispute
revolving around the activities of two United States corporations in the Costa
Rican banana market." Writing for the Court, Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes deferred to international law and custom and declined to accept
jurisdiction and apply the Sherman Act to a monopoly existing in Costa
Rica: "Mhe general and almost universal rule is that the character of an act
Denver Bldg. and Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S 675, 692 (1951).
3 In 1982, the U.S. Supreme Court listed these two purposes as the two goals behind the
secondary boycotts provision of the NLRA. International Longshoremen's Ass'n. v. Allied
Int'l, 456 U.S. 212, 223 (1982).
975 F.2d at 789.
International Longshoremen's, 56 F.3d at 215.
40 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
4 ldI at 354-355.
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as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country
where the act is done. ' 42 In focusing upon the issue of whether Congress
had the authority to regulate any activities occurring abroad,43 Holmes
proposed that in the absence of a clear mandate-from Congress, a court must
limit the operation of its laws to the "territorial limits over which the
lawmaker has general and legitimate power." This sweeping presumption
against the extraterritorial application of federal law was a direct application
of the turn-of-the-century prevailing view that jurisdiction and hence the
ability of courts to act was limited by the geographic boundaries of
territoriality. 45 If territoriality is the primary basis of jurisdiction, a court
is less likely to regulate conduct outside its borders and run the risk of
encroaching on the sovereignty of fellow nations.'
In American Banana, Justice Holmes articulated a view of extraterritoriali-
ty that would remain the prevailing judicial view of the extraterritorial
application of federal statutes until the 1930s. 47 By the early 1930s, courts
began to modify this strict geographically-dependent territorial approach."
Nations, including the United States, began to realize that it was to their
advantage to be able to wield some degree of control over the activities of
their citizens while they were overseas,49 and it was to their disadvantage
if they could not.' What was a strict rule against the extraterritorial
application of U.S. law beyond U.S. borders slowly evolved,5' shaped by
the political realities of a world shrinking in size due to technological
advances in communications and travel.
42 Id. at 356.
43 See Derek G. Barella, Note, Checking the "Trigger Happy Congress: The Extraterrito-
rial Extension of Federal Employment Laws Requires Prudence, 69 IND. L.J. 889, 891 (1994).
4213 U.S. at 357.
45 See Jonathan Turley, Legal Theory: "When in Rome": Multinational Misconduct and
the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 598, 604 (1990).
4213 U.S. at 356.
47 Turley, supra note 45, at 604.
4Id.
4" In this Note, the terms "overseas" and "abroad" are not to be strictly interpreted but are
used merely to identify places outside the borders of the United States, including Canada and
Mexico.
o Barella, supra note 43, at 892.
s' Turley attributes the evolution to the two alternative bases for territorial jurisdiction,
objective territoriality and subjective territoriality. Under objective territoriality, a state could
"legitimately extend jurisdiction extraterritorially where the conduct in question occurred
within the state ... Under a subjective theory, a state has jurisdiction whenever certain
conduct has territorial effects ...." Turley, supra note 45, at 604-05.
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In Blackmer v. United States,2 the Supreme Court stopped short of
overruling the presumption against extraterritoriality as set forth in American
Banana. In considering the transnational application of the Walsh Act,53
and its express Congressional mandate for extraterritorial jurisdiction, the
Blackmer court veered from the strict territorialist approach of American
Banana and held that the act applied transnationally and that such transna-
tional application was legitimate under international law.' With Blackmer,
the presumption involved in the extraterritorial application of U.S. law had
changed from the virtual irrebuttable presumption against such application,
as espoused in American Banana,5 to a presumption which allowed for the
extraterritorial application of U.S. law only when Congress expressed the
intent of transnational application.
At that time in U.S. legal history, there were two primary rationales for
the presumption against the extraterritorial application of U.S. law. The first
rationale was that Congress "does not idly, or silently, enter into conflicts
with foreign sovereigns or international principles." ' What was crucial in
Blackmer was that the Court was presented with an issue of extraterritorial
application of a U.S. law that would not significantly intrude on the
sovereignty of other nations.57 This made extending the application of this
U.S. law judicially palatable. The second rationale behind the presumption
against the extraterritorial application of U.S. law was expressed in Foley
Bros. v. Filardo,8 where the Supreme Court faced the issue of the extrater-
ritorial application of a Federal employment statute, the Eight Hour Law.59
52 Blackrner v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932).
s Walsh Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1783-1784 (1994). The Walsh Act gave express approval of
service of process on American citizens in foreign lands.
" "The law of Nations does not prevent a State from exercising jurisdiction over its
subjects travelling or residing abroad, since they remain under its personal supremacy".
Blackmer, 284 U.S. at 437 n.2 (1932).
5 And a presumption which questioned the very authority of Congress to mandate
transnational application of U.S. law.
'6 Turley, supra note 45, at 606.
57 See Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804). "[A]n act of
[Clongress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations, if any other possible
construction remains ...."
58 336 U.S. 281 (1949).
59 The Eight Hour Law established that no employee "shall be required or permitted to
work more than eight hours in any one calendar day upon such work" except for paid work
"in excess of eight hours per day at not less than one and one-half times the basic rate of
pay." 40 U.S.C. § 324-325 (1940).
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In Foley Bros. v. Filardo, an American cook sued for the overtime due to
him for his service on construction projects in Iraq and Iran.60 Based on
the presumption against extraterritorial application of U.S. law, the Supreme
Court reversed a New York Court of Appeals decision allowing the cook a
recovery for uncompensated overtime.6' The Court reaffirmed the
Blackmer rationale that legislation, absent express Congressional authoriza-
tion, is limited by the territorial boundaries of the United States.62 More
importantly, the Foley Bros. Court formally stated the second rationale
behind the presumption against the transnational application of U.S. laws.
The Court reasoned that Congress is "primarily concerned with domestic
conditions" when it enacts legislation.63 This rationale has been a strong
guiding impetus for courts who have considered the transnational application
of U.S. employment laws. 64
The modern analysis of the transnational application of U.S. statutes
incorporates an expanded view of the territorial principle, operating under the
titles of the "effects doctrine" or "objective territoriality."' This expanded
view recognizes the authority of the Federal courts or Congress to regulate
actions outside of its geographic boundaries if such actions have or are
intended to have substantial territorial effects.M
While this new modern analysis has expanded the jurisdiction of certain
statutes,67 the history of the judicial application of U.S. employment laws
and the NLRA has generally followed a very traditional, territorial approach.
In 1991, the Supreme Court revived and reaffirmed this traditional approach
10 Foley Bros., 336 U.S. 281, 283 (1949).
61 Id. at 290-91.
" Id. at 285.
6 id.
See Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U.S. 138, 144 (1957).
Barella, supra note 43, at 894. Turley and Barella differ as to whether to call the
effects doctrine subjective (Turley) or objective (Barella). See also Turley, supra note 45,
at 605.
6RETATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNTED STATES § 402
cmt. d (1986).
6 Such statutes include antitrust and securities laws. Turley classifies the type of statute
as either "market" statutes or "nonmarket" statutes. Turley points out that securities and
antitrust laws, "market" laws primarily intended to protect market interests, are consistently
granted extraterritorial application, even though Congress has been silent on whether such
extraterritorial application was intended. "Nonmarket" statutes such as employment or
environmental laws, "are consistently denied extraterritorial application." Turley, supra note
45, at 601.
442 [Vol. 26:433
SECONDARY BOYCOTTS ABROAD
regarding the extraterritoriality of U.S employment laws with its analysis in
Boureslan v. Aramco.68 In Aramco, the court made clear that the protection
afforded employees under the umbrella of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 196469 did not extend beyond the geographic borders of the United
States.
In Aramco, the petitioner, Ali Boureslan, a naturalized citizen of the
United States, sued under Title VII alleging he was fired and harassed on
account of his race while working in Saudi Arabia.70 The Supreme Court
relied heavily on the 1949 decision of Foley Bros.," and held that absent a
clear statement72 by Congress, Title VII did not apply' extraterritorially
to regulate the employment practices of United States firms that employ
American citizens abroad.74 As Aramco indicates, the focus of the courts
on the extraterritorial application of employment laws has been, and remains,
on whether Congress, with regard to a particular employment statute, has
evidenced the necessary affirmative intent to warrant the extraterritorial
application of the employment statute in question."
2. The National Labor Relations Act
The extraterritorial application of the NLRA has been considered by the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and by the Federal courts under a
variety of factual settings. The language of the Act itself would appear to
'a EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
69 Title VII prohibits various discriminatory employment practices by employers
(employing 15 or more employees for a specified period and engaged in an industry affecting
commerce) based on an individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2, 2000e-3, 2000e(h) (1994).
70 499 U.S. 244, 246 (1991).
7' 336 U.S. 281.
72 In his dissent in Aramco, Justice Marshall argued that the Foley Bros. presumption
against extraterritoriality does not require a clear statement, but instead suggests that Foley
Bros. indicates that "a court is not free to invoke the presumption against extraterritoriality
until it has exhausted all available indicia of Congress' intent on this subject." 499 U.S. at
265 (1991).
7 In the wake of Aramco, Congress amended Title VII so that U.S. companies operating
abroad are now within the jurisdiction of Title VII's protection.
4 499 U.S. at 258.
7 Michael L. Goldberg, Labor Relations and Labor Standards for Employees of United
States Enterprises Working in Foreign Areas, 48 N.D. L. REV. 23, 26-27 (1971). This idea
follows the presumption expressed in Filardo.
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grant wide jurisdictional authority to the NLRB.76 Despite the broad
language of the NLRA," courts have generally"8 denied NLRA jurisdic-
tion in NLRA cases involving significant foreign elements or actors.79
The difficulty in ascertaining the precedential value of past cases
interpreting the extraterritorial application of the NLRA lies in the fact that
many of the cases involve unique or very specific fact patterns and often the
language of the holdings of such cases is tailored to the specific facts of the
particular case. Interpreting such precedent is further complicated by the
different decision-makers involved in interpreting the reach of the NLRA-
namely the NLRB, the lower Federal Courts, and the Supreme Court.
Several commentators and a few courts have questioned whether the true
issue of the extraterritoriality of the NLRA has yet to be determined.'
The leading cases"' which have consulted the legislative history of the
NLRA to determine whether or not Congress intended the Act to have
transnational jurisdiction have been maritime suits.82 A series of Supreme
Court decisions have created or have been recognized as creating the
parameters of the jurisdiction of the NLRB when the dispute involves
American Unions and foreign-flag ships. Benz v. Compania Naviera
Hidalgo8 3 is the seminal case in this area, and one on which other decisions
on extraterritoriality have relied.8" In Benz, the Supreme Court held that the
76 Section 10(a) of the Act empowers the Board to "prevent any person from engaging
in any unfair labor practice ... affecting commerce." 29 U.S.C. 160(a) (1994). The Act
defines commerce broadly as "trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or communication...
between any foreign country and any state.. ." (29 U.S.C. 152(6)) and defines "affecting
commerce" as "in commerce, or burdening or obstructing commerce" (29 U.S.C. 152(7)
(1994)).
" Note also the necessary Congressional intent that could be inferred from the plain
meaning of the words of such legislation.
78 The courts, however, have not been consistent.
" Gary Z. Nothstein and Jeffrey P. Ayres, The Multinational Corporation and the
Extraterritorial Application of the Labor Management Relations Act, 10 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
1, 63 (1976).
o Nothstein and Ayres, supra note 79, at 24; Dowd, 975 F.2d 779, 787 (1992).
s' The cases with the greatest precedential impact.
82 The fact that the leading cases are maritime suits has complicated the question to be
resolved because maritime suits bring in issues of the law of the sea and issues of
international custom afforded to vessels of other nations.
353 U.S. 138 (1957).
s4 See, e.g., American Radio Ass'n v. Mobile Steamship Ass'n, 419 U.S. 215 (1974);
Dowd, 975 F.2d 799 (11th Cir. 1992).
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Labor Management Relations Act 5 does not apply in cases where the
damages result from the picketing of a foreign ship sailing under foreign
articles, operated entirely by foreign seamen, when the vessel was temporari-
ly in an American port.8 6 The Court, in depriving the National Relations
Board of jurisdiction in the dispute, pointed out that Congress "could have
made the Act applicable to wage disputes arising on foreign vessels between
nationals of other countries when the vessel comes within our territorial
waters. ' 7  However, the Court reasoned that given the Act's overall
emphasis and focus on matters of industrial strife between American
employers and American employees, the NLRA was not enacted by Congress
in order to resolve disputes arising under the laws of foreign nations,
between foreign crews, and foreign employers.8 8 A primary concern of the
Benz court was that if the Board were to have jurisdiction in such a case, it
would be interfering in a particularly delicate field of international relations
and international custom. 9 The Court used a "not in commerce" rationale
as a device for depriving the NLRB of jurisdiction, despite the broad scope
given to "commerce" as evidenced by the Act's plain language.9° Benz is
significant in that it was first in the line of Supreme Court decisions that
held the NLRB may lack jurisdiction over labor disputes involving
significant foreign elements. 9
McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras92 was the
next Supreme Court decision placing another brick in the wall of the
presumption against extraterritoriality of the NLRA. In McCulloch, the
National Maritime Union of America sought to become the collective
bargaining representative for the Honduran Crew of a Honduran ship. The
' The LMRA includes the NLRA, and future cases denying extraterritorial application
of the NLRA have cited Benz as directly controlling authority.
353 U.S. at 139.
87 Id. at 142.
" Id. at 143.
9 "For us to run interference in such a delicate field of international relations, there must
be present the affirmative intent of Congress clearly expressed. It alone has the facilities
necessary to make fairly such an important policy decision where the possibilities of
international discord are so evident and retaliative action so certain." I. at 147.
90 29 U.S.C. 152(6)-(7) (1994).
91 Steven E. Abraham, Note, NLRB Jurisdiction of Secondary Boycotts: ILA v. Allied
National, Inc., A Missed Opportunity for the Supreme Court to Reevaluate Mobile, 15 N.Y.U
J. INT'L L. & POL. 395, 412 (1983).
92 372 U.S. 10 (1963).
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Court found the NLRB was without jurisdiction to order representation
elections on vessels which employed Honduran crews under Honduran
articles and who had regular contact with a Honduran Union on registered
vessels of a Honduran corporation,93 operating under the employment laws
of Honduras." The Court ruled that despite the frequent contact the vessel
had with American waters,95 the jurisdiction of the NLRA would have an
immediate effect on the internal operations of a foreign vessel.96 Again, the
Court used the "not in commerce" rationale set forth in Benz.
97
Similarly,9" in Incres Steamship Co. v. International Maritime Workers
Union,99 an American union sought to organize the foreign crew of a
foreign vessel, and proceeded to picket to accomplish these ends."°°
Consistent with Benz and McCulloch, the Court denied the jurisdiction of the
NLRB to order a representation election, stating "[T]he Board's jurisdiction
to prevent unfair labor practices, like its jurisdiction to direct elections, is
based upon circumstances 'affecting commerce', and we have concluded that
the maritime operations of foreign-flag ships employing alien seamen are not
'in commerce' ... "101
The next important judicial development came in ILA Local 1415 v.
Ariadne Shipping CoY°2 In Ariadne, an American union, the ILA, was
picketing foreign-flag ships to protest the substandard wages paid to the non-
union American stevedores who unloaded these ships. The vessel owners
sought injunctive relief under Florida state law, and the union contended
state law was preempted by the NLRA, which they maintained had
jurisdiction over the labor dispute. 3 The Supreme Court found that the
" The Court arrived at this conclusion despite the fact the Honduran Corporation was a
wholly owned subsidiary of United Fruit Company, a New Jersey corporation. Id at 13.
94 Id. at 14.
9' In Benz, the vessel had limited contact with American waters.
96 372 U.S. at 20.
' The Supreme Court expressed a judicial desire to prohibit the intrusion of the NLRB
into the internal affairs of a ship sailing under a foreign flag. For the purposes of maritime
law, a ship is considered to be part of the territory of nation whose flag she flies. See
Comment, Foreign Ships in American Ports: The Question of NLRB Jurisdiction, 9 CORNELL
INT'L. LJ. 50, 62 (1976).
And on the same day as McCulloch.
" Incres Steamship, 372 U.S. 24 (1963).
100 Id. at 25-26.
101 Id. at 27.
"m 397 U.S. 195 (1970).
103 Id. at 196-97.
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activities by the union taken on behalf of American stevedores were not
within the maritime operations of foreign-flag ships," and as such, any
ruling would not conflict with international law. Furthermore, the initial
dispute, the paying of wages to American longshoremen, was "in commerce"
within the meaning of the NLRA.105 The Court thus found NLRA jurisdic-
tion applicable.1 0
°6
The Ariadne holding is especially significant because it recognizes that
some labor disputes which involve foreign elements may nevertheless fall
within the jurisdiction of the NLRA. The Ariadne Court conducted a
balancing test of the degree to which the dispute affects American workers,
the American economy, or NLRA policy versus the interference in the
maritime operations of foreign ships.
The next ship in the fleet of the Supreme court maritime cases is
Windward Shipping (London) Ltd v. American Radio Ass'nJ" In this case,
American unions picketed foreign-owned vessels in protest of the substan-
dard wages paid to the foreign crewmen who manned these vesseis' 8 The
Court in Windward displayed an important understanding of the extraterrito-
riality issue by pointing out that the activities in Benz and McCulloch were
no less "in commerce" than were those in Ariadne; rather jurisdiction had
been denied in those cases because it had never been the intent of Congress
in drafting the National Labor Relations Act to "erase longstanding principles
of comity and accommodation in international maritime trade."'' 9 While
noting that the picketing activities in Windward did not involve the same
intrusion into the affairs of foreign ships present in Benz and McCulloch, the
picketing did possess numerous foreign elements. The picketing was
intended to protest "wages paid to foreign seamen who were employed by
foreign shipowners under contracts made outside the United States."'110
Due to the fact that the picketing would force the foreign vessel owners to
'04 And as such not subject to Benz precedent which would hold any interference in
foreign-flag maritime activities beyond the scope of the Act.
105 Jeffrey K. Ross, American Legal Restrictions on the Use of Union Economic Weapons
Against Multinational Employers, 10 CORNELL INT'L. L.J. 59 (1976).
06 397 U.S. at 200.
1 415 U.S. 104 (1974).
108 It is important to note that the interest displayed by the Union was not out of altruism
but rather out of a desire to eliminate the low wages which could undercut their own ability
to obtain employment at a higher wage. Id. at 114.
'o9 Id. at 112-13.
"o id. at 114.
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raise the wages they paid their own maritime employees, a large scale
increase in maritime operating costs would naturally result. Such an increase
would have "more than a negligible impact on the maritime operations of
foreign ships." '' Thus in Windward, the primary issue of whether the
dispute was "in commerce" turned on the critical inquiry established in Benz:
whether NLRB jurisdiction would cause an impermissible intrusion into the
hallowed international ground of the maritime affairs of foreign ships."'
The Supreme Court faced a case with essentially the same facts as
Windward in American Radio Ass'n v. Mobile Steamship Ass'n."3  In
Mobile, United States stevedoring companies brought suit against American
unions who were picketing to protest the substandard wages paid by foreign
shipowners to foreign seamen." 4 Following its lead in the connected case
of Windward,"5 the Court found" 6 that since the primary dispute was
found to be beyond the jurisdiction of the NLRA," 7 the secondary dispute
arising from the same set of facts could not be considered to be within the
Act either."' The Court came to this conclusion despite the fact that the
parties in dispute were American employees and American employers. In
their determination of whether the dispute was within "commerce," the
Mobile Court found it important that the dispute was directed toward the
"substandard wages being paid to the crews of foreign-flag vessels through-
out those vessels' worldwide maritime operations."'" 9 The union activity
was not "affecting commerce" because of its possible foreign effects."
In 1982, the provision of the NLRA prohibiting secondary boycotts'
2
'
gave rise to another dispute regarding the extraterritoriality of U.S. labor law
in International Longshoremen's Association v. Allied International.'1
I' d.
112 Id. at 113-14.
"' 419 U.S. 215 (1974).
114 The companies brought suit because their own employees were refusing to cross the
picket lines of the Unions to unload the foreign vessels and their businesses were negatively
impacted. 419 U.S. 215, 236.
11 The six American unions who were the petitioners in Mobile were the respondents in
Windward. 419 U.S at 217.
116 Over the vigorous dissents of Justice Douglas and Justice Stewart.
"7 Windward, 415 U.S. 104 (1973).
IRS 419 U.S. at 224.
119 Id. at 223 n.9.
'20 Ross, supra note 105, at 67.
2 § 8(b)(4)(b) of the National Labor Relations Act.
m 456 U.S. 212 (1982).
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The dispute arose out of the Russian invasion of Afghanistan." In protest
of this act of aggression, the International Longshoremen's Association (ILA)
refused to load or unload cargoes shipped to or from the Soviet Union." u
An American importer of Russian wood products, Allied International, Inc.,
sought to bring this boycott to a halt, since its wood shipments had been
disrupted by the activities of the ILA." Allied filed suit alleging the
boycott violated the provision against secondary boycotts of the NLRA.
Despite the fact that the primary dispute was with a foreign entity,"2 the
Supreme Court held that ILA's activity was "in commerce" and within the
jurisdiction of the NLRA.Y In approving the jurisdiction of the NLRA
in the dispute, the Court focused on the impact NLRB jurisdiction would
have on American employers and American workers, and how minimal the
impact on foreign entities would be.
What is to be drawn from this maritime litany of Supreme Court cases"~
that deal with the application of the NLRA to foreign ships and foreign
seamen? Are we to presume that the NLRA never applies to activities
occurring abroad?'" Does the presumption against extraterritoriality of
U.S laws end when actions and events occurring outside the boundaries of
'2' Id. at 214.
I2A Id.
'25 Id. at 215.
... The Soviet Union.
127 "... mhe ILA's refusal to unload Allied's shipments in no way affected
the maritime operations of foreign ships. The boycott did not aim at
altering the terms of employment of foreign crews on foreign-flag vessels.
It did not seek to extend the bill of rights developed for American
workers and American employers to foreign seamen and foreign
shipowners."
456 U.S. at 221.
128 This is not to say that these Supreme Court cases are the only cases that have dealt
with the application of the NLRA in cases with significant foreign elements. Other cases of
some import that have dealt with this issue: GTE Automatic Elec., Inc., 226 NLRB 1222
(1976) (no jurisdiction over American employer of American employees where employer was
doing business in Iran); RCA OMS, Inc., 202 N.L.R.B. 228 (1973) (no jurisdiction over
Danish employer doing business in Greenland where employees, although hired in United
States, worked exclusively in Greenland where controversy arose); Labor Union of Pico Korea
Ltd. v. Pico Prods., Inc., 968 F.2d 191 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 493 (1992).
'" See Frank Balzano, Comment, Extraterritorial Application of the National Labor
Relations Act, 62 U. CmN. L. REv. 573 (1993).
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the United States are felt within its borders?13° Is the fundamental question
whether or not such extraterritorial application would best serve the interests
of the state?131  Judging from the dispute between Circuits 32 regarding
the range and scope of U.S law in enjoining the ILA from encouraging
Japanese stevedoring unions to refuse to handle Florida citrus loaded by non-
union labor,133 the question may still be open. Or is it?
II. THE DECISIONS IN DOWD 134 AND INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN'S
ASSOCIATION (ILA): 135 CONTRASTING POSITIONS
The decision by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Dowd granting
the NLRB jurisdiction over the ILA was in keeping with the intent of the
secondary boycott provision of the National Labor Relations Act. In Dowd,
the Court considered whether it was appropriate for the NLRA to govern the
solicitation by the ILA of Japanese unions to coerce Japanese importers to
boycott certain American stevedoring companies. 36 In rejecting the ILA's
claim that the NLRB lacked jurisdiction, the Court held that the NLRA
governed the dispute. 137 What the Court found instrumental in determining
that the NLRA applied 138 was that the jurisdiction of the NLRA would not
have impacted the internal operations of foreign vessels. 139  It was the
impact on foreign vessels and this intrusion on "longstanding principles of
comity and accommodation in international maritime trade" that the Benz
'3 In the frequently quoted opinion of Judge Wilkey:
"Certainly the doctrine of territorial sovereignty is not such an artificial
limit on the vindication of legitimate sovereign interests that the injured
state confronts the wrong side of a one-way glass, powerless to counteract
harmful effects originating outside its boundaries, which easily pierce its
"sovereign" walls, while its own regulatory efforts are reflected back in
its face."
Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena Belgium World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 923 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
13' See Note, Constructing the State Extraterritorially: Jurisdictional Discourse, The
National Interest, and Transnational Norms, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1273 (1990).
132 The Eleventh Circuit and the District of Columbia Circuit.
'3 See supra section entitled "Historical Facts of Dispute".
'34 Dowd, 975 F.2d 779.
131 International Longshoremen's, 56 F.3d 205.
" 975 F.2d 779, 781-83.
137 Id. at 788.
138 Other than the fact that a secondary boycott apparently had occurred.
'3 975 F.2d at 788.
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presumption sought to protect; the oft-cited Benz did not provide a general
rule regarding extraterritoriality." ° The Court reasoned the Benz line of
cases "do not represent generally applicable boundaries of commerce", rather
the Benz cases 141 merely clarify the intent of Congress that the words "in
commerce" are not meant to clash with principles of international law. 4 2
This conclusion drawn by the Eleventh Circuit court is the heart of its
reasoning that the NLRA should apply to this dispute.
The court in Dowd does not seek to refute the individual conclusions
drawn in the cases cited by the ILA as establishing the presumption against
extraterritoriality. Rather the court treats the holdings in the cases of
Benz,' 43 McCulloch,'" and Aramco45 as binding to those fact patterns only,
and since different facts are involved in this scenario, the court is able to
distinguish those cases from the facts of this dispute. In this manner the
court rebuts the general presumption against extraterritoriality by explaining
that these cases do not stand for such an "unsophisticated" presumption."
The court is, however, quick to draw parallels between the facts of this
dispute and cases involving foreign elements where the NLRA was held to
apply, like Ariadne47 and Allied.'4 The court cites Allied and Ariadne
to indicate areas where the Supreme Court saw fit to apply the NLRA
because of the lack of conflict with international principles. 49
The Dowd court departs from labor precedent in its analysis in one
significant respect. The Court justified jurisdiction in the matter by using an
14 Id.
"1 Which have been interpreted to limit the application of the NLRA to the boundaries
of the United States.
142 975 F.2d 779, 788. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed
with this conclusion in NLRB v. Dredge Operators, Inc., 19 F.3d 206, 211 (1994).
43 See supra notes 83-90 and accompanying text.
'44 See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
145 See supra notes 68-74 and accompanying text.
'4 975 F.2d 779, 788. Some commentators have faulted the Eleventh circuit as too easily
dismissing the "clear statement" presumption of Aramco. See Eileen M. Cedrone, Comment,
Labor Law-NLRB Jurisdiction-NLRA Governs American Union's Attempt to Solicit Japanese
Importers' Boycott of American Stevedores, 17 SuFF. TRANSNAT'L. L. REv. 609, 617-618
(1994); Balzano, supra note 125, at 591.
147 See supra notes 99-103.
148 See supra notes 119-124. The Dowd court quoted verbatim the passage cited in note
127. 975 F.2d 779, 787.
149 975 F.2d 779, 788.
1997]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
"effects" analysis."5  Such an effects analysis had been limited to the
extraterritorial application of antitrust and securities statutes, 151 and the
Dowd Court analogizes this dispute to cases governed by the Sherman Anti-
Trust Act, and the Securities and Exchange Act.152
After explaining how it could grant the NLRA jurisdiction in this matter,
the court went on to explain why the NLRA should be applied to this
dispute. The court justified granting jurisdiction by asserting that several
factors combined to favor applying the NLRA to this dispute.15 3 Applying
the NLRA to this dispute would best serve the purpose of the secondary
boycott provision, shielding neutral employers from pressure in labor
disputes to which they are not parties and limiting the spread of industrial
labor strife." The court also noted that favoring the application of the
NLRA was that the ILA took steps in furtherance of the boycott while in the
United States'55 and that the intended target, the "primary opponents,""
were American companies. 57 Further, the court noted that any action
taken would be against a domestic labor organization in a dispute with U.S.
employer.15
8
In sum, the Dowd court weighed the costs of applying the NLRA to the
dispute versus the benefits to be attained from such application. The court,
in ascertaining the costs, noted that there would be no potential for conflict
with foreign laws or foreign workers, and that there would be no internation-
al outcry resulting from any U.S. action taken against the ILA, an American
labor organization. Further, the court was careful to tailor its holding to the
facts of the case, so that there would be no potential undue expansion of
150 "Since the object and the effect of the conduct in question was to implement a
secondary boycott within the United States, we do not believe the location of that conduct is
determinative." 975 F.2d at 790. This is similar to the effects doctrine espoused by Judge
Learned Hand in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
1' Barella, supra 43, at 894.
"5 In drawing such analogies, the court reveals the lack of support it has in the labor
arena. 975 F.2d 779, 790.
' Id. at 790-91.
'5 Id. at 789. The court was concerned with the impact the Japanese boycott was having
on the neutral entities of the Canaveral Port Authority, which received a tariff on vessels
loaded by Canaveral (a non-Union stevedoring Company with which the ILA had the dispute),
as well as the exporters with whom Coastal and Canaveral conducted business.
'55 See supra note 12.
'5 See supra note 23.
"" 975 F.2d at 790-91.
'5 Id. at 790-91.
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labor jurisdiction in further cases using this case as a guide. The benefit to
be gained by applying the NLRA to this dispute would be the furthering of
the intent of the drafters of the secondary boycott provision of the NLRA.
The statutory "black hole"'59 created by a lack of NLRA jurisdiction would
enable American unions to create labor havoc abroad. "In an increasingly
global economy, the opportunities abound for U.S unions to initiate harmful
secondary activities by unions representing employees of the foreign trade
partner. Permitting U.S unions to escape responsibility purely on geographic
grounds for the economic harm they unleash subverts the purpose of the
Act."16t In the court's eye, the balancing test of costs versus benefits
resulted in the application of the NLRA.
How is it that the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia, in Interna-
tional Longshoremen's Association (ILA), came to such a different
conclusion in June of 1995? The answer lies in the manner in which the
court viewed the Supreme Court cases dealing with the application of the
NLRA on foreign vessels-its view of precedent: ".... [The Supreme Court
in a long line of cases has held that Congress never intended the Act to
apply to labor disputes involving foreign workers operating under foreign
laws on foreign flag ships,. . . and we certainly can conceive of no basis for
a different result where the relevant dispute occurs on foreign soil,
.. " 6 The court then cites the string of maritime cases discussed earlier
in this Note. The Dowd Court, it would then seem, gave too little weight to
the principles guiding such Supreme Court decisions. 62 But in justifying
its conclusion, the D.C. Circuit, in ILA, glossed over the amount of
American involvement in the dispute' 63 and the lack of remedy that would
be left to the affected neutral American parties."6  The ILA court also
failed to address the broad statutory language of the Act'6 and the broad
159 Longshoremen's Association Tells NLRB That U.S. Labor Laws Do Not Reach Japan,
BNA INTERNATIONAL BusiEsS & FINANCE DAILY, Oct. 28, 1993.
160 International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 313 N.L.R.B. at 415.
161 56 F.3d at 211.
'62 Citing Benz, the D.C. Circuit noted the NLRA focus on "the American workingman"
and describing the "boundaries of the Act as including only the workingmen of our own
country and its possessions." 56 F.3d 205, 210.
163 The union was a domestic one, the primary opponents of the unions were domestic,
and some of the affected neutral parties were domestic.
'" The Canaveral Port Authority and the affected exporters doing business with Coastal
and Canaveral.
165 See supra note 35.
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reading the Supreme Court had given the statute quite recently in Allied, a
case involving significant foreign elements." The ILA court did not
address the issue that NLRA jurisdiction in this dispute would require
nothing of a foreign party; it would not interfere with the employment
conditions of foreign workers, and it would not interfere with the laws of
Japan. 67 The law on the extraterritoriality of the NLRA, if ILA is to be
the standard, leaves much to be desired and much to be explained.
III. A PROPOSmON
This Note will propose a judicial approach that will be consistent with the
past interpretations of the jurisdiction of the NLRA, and in recognition of the
growing globalization of U.S. commerce and in keeping with legislative
intent of the act, set forth the following proposition: Secondary boycotts of
U.S. products conducted abroad which are solicited by U.S. unions acting in
the United States are a violation of the secondary boycotts provision of the
National Labor Relations Act.'6
Section 8(B)(4)(i) of the Labor Management Relations Act'6 specifically
targets union actions to engage in, or induce or encourage others employed
in commerce to engage in, a strike or a refusal to work on goods.7 The
issue in this dispute is whether or not the foreign labor unions are "in
commerce" within the meaning of the Act. The Act defines "commerce"
broadly as "trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or communication...
between any foreign country and any State .. .""' and the Act defines
"affecting commerce" as "in commerce, or burdening or obstructing
commerce.. . ."" Is there any doubt that the Florida-Japan citrus trade
166 In Allied, supra notes 119-124, the primary opponent was Russia, and the Court
granted NLRB jurisdiction, stating § 8(b)(4) of the NLRA "was drafted broadly to protect
neutral parties"; !Congress "intended its prohibition to reach broadly"; it is a "statutory
provision purposefully drafted in broadest terms."
167 This is not to say that the Dowd decision has been universally supported. "mhe
Eleventh Circuit made the wrong decision in Dowd." Balzano, supra note 129, at 591.
'" For a different approach to the extraterritorial application of the NLRA, see Bradford
T. Hammock, The Extraterritorial Application of the National Labor Relations Act: A Union
Perspective, 22 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 127 (1996).
169 See supra note 29.
170 56 F.3d 205.
'' 29 U.S.C. §152(6) (1996).
'72 29 U.S.C. 152(7) (1994).
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qualifies as "commerce" within the meaning of the Act?"" Is there any
doubt that the activities of the ILA, in soliciting the boycott of Japanese
union stevedores, "affected commerce?" Based on the threatened boycott,
neutral entities ceased doing business with Coastal and Canaveral; shippers
and importers changed the loading ports to Tampa from Ft. Pierce and Port
Canaveral and exporters hauled their produce to Tampa instead of the closer
ports of Port Canaveral and Fort Pierce." 4 Clearly the neutral parties
affected by the boycott here fall within the class the Act intended to protect.
The solution to the controversy lies in avoiding the presumption against
extraterritorial application of the NLRA by applying the provisions of the
NLRA only against violating parties who are within U.S. borders and where
there are strong domestic ties to the labor dispute. In a case like this where
certain actions took place within the borders of the United States, and the
parties to the suit are domestic entities, it would seem natural that jurisdic-
tion would not be exercised extraterritorially 73 By approaching the matter
in this way, by only controlling the activities of U.S. citizens and entities, the
intent of the NLRA can be preserved without intruding on the laws of other
nations or their sovereignty.
Even if such an application might be termed by some to be extraterritorial,
and would undoubtedly have effects beyond the borders of the United States,
the larger question must be whether applying the Act in this manner, so that
the bargaining relationship between employers and employees is not unfairly
tilted to the employees' advantage,176 acts to the general benefit of the
United States. And if it does, should this "extraterritorial" reach, in the
absence of Congressional action, be judicially accomplished?
In a situation such as the one previously described, it is clearly within the
discretion of the Federal Courts to take action against the defendant union
in the matter. The gains to be made by exercising jurisdiction over the
parties in this dispute are clear, and the risks articulated in cases establishing
the presumption against the extraterritorial application of labor law,"
given these facts, are minimal.
173 The answer is a resounding "No."
174 See supra note 159.
173 The Eleventh Circuit broaches this subject: "Further, the conduct charged in the
Board's petition is not wholly extraterritorial." Dowd, 975 F.2d 779, 791.
176 With the growing dependence of U.S. companies on overseas markets, labor would be
granted a weighty bargaining tool if employees (collectively) were able to hinder or even halt
access to foreign markets through secondary boycotts abroad.
177 Aramco, supra note 68; Benz, supra note 83.
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The benefits to be attained from NLRA application within this context are
many. If the parties to the dispute are determined not to be "in commerce,"
the NLRA is not to apply. If the NLRA is not to apply, there is no federal
preemption of state law. Without a federal preemption of state law in such
labor disputes, the potential for conflict exists between the laws of states and
the NLRA stemming from the dual regulation of labor relations. One of the
primary concerns provoking the drafting of the NLRA was the necessity for
only one set of uniform governmental labor policies.'78 Jurisdiction in this
matter serves these ends, as well as the ends sought in drafting the secondary
boycott provision.'
Allowing the application of the NLRA in this dispute involving these
parties will not violate the principles of accommodation and comitys ° that
the Supreme Court sought to preserve in articulating its presumption against
extraterritoriality."' Here, where the jurisdiction would only negatively
impact U.S. parties, there is no reasonable fear of reprisal from abroad or
conflict of laws with other nations. Balancing the benefits to be achieved
with the potential costs to be incurred, NLRA jurisdiction was appropriate
under these circumstances.
178 See Dan T. Carter, Note, NLRB Jurisdiction Over Foreign Governments, 11 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 483, 497-98 (1978).
'7 See supra notes 36-37.
180 International comity consists of that body of rules which states observe towards one
another from courtesy or mutual convenience, although they do not form part of international
law. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
" The presumption against extraterritoriality "serves to protect against unintended clashes
between our laws and those of other nations which could result in international discord."
Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248.
[Vol. 26:433
